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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RICHARD PHILLIP VAUGHAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 45353
Ada County Case No.
CR-FE-2013-10655

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Issue
Has Vaughan failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by
relinquishing jurisdiction, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of his concurrent
unified sentences of five years, with two years fixed, imposed following his guilty pleas to two
counts of delivery of a controlled substance?

Vaughan Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
In August 2013, a grand jury indicted Vaughan on four counts of delivery of a controlled
substance. (R., pp.23-25.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Vaughan pled guilty to two counts of
delivery of a controlled substance and the state dismissed the remaining charges. (R., p.36.) The
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district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of five years, with two years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.46-49.) Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district
court suspended Vaughan's sentences and placed him on supervised probation for five years.
(R., pp.57-64.)
In November 2016, the state filed a motion for probation violation alleging that Vaughan
had violated the conditions of his probation by failing to attend Relapse Prevention; failing to
engage in intensive outpatient treatment at Recovery 4 Life; being removed from inpatient
treatment at the Walker Center for “failing to engage in treatment and offering controlled
substances to other program participants”; failing to submit to UA testing on four separate
occasions; changing residences without permission on two separate occasions; using “OxyContin
on a regular basis”; using marijuana in May 2016; testing positive for methamphetamine, heroin,
and marijuana in August 2016; and failing to pay his cost of supervision, restitution, and other
court-ordered financial obligations. (R., pp.65-68.) Vaughan admitted that he violated the
conditions of his probation by failing to attend Relapse Prevention, failing to engage in intensive
outpatient treatment at Recovery 4 Life, failing to submit to UA testing on four separate
occasions, using OxyContin on a regular basis, and testing positive for methamphetamine and
marijuana, and the state withdrew the remaining allegations. (R., pp.91-92.) The district court
revoked Vaughan's probation, executed the underlying sentence, and retained jurisdiction a
second time. (R., pp.95-98.) Following the second period of retained jurisdiction, the district
relinquished jurisdiction. (R., pp.103-110.) Vaughan filed a notice of appeal timely from the
district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., pp.111-13.) He also filed a timely Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (R., pp.116, 127-30.)
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Vaughan asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction
in light of his performance during “the first two years he was on probation” and during his
second rider. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.) Vaughan has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.” I.C. § 19-2601(4). The
decision to place a defendant on probation or whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the
defendant is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned
on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 889, 303 P.3d 241,
248 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v.
Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205–06, 786 P.2d 594, 596–97 (Ct. App. 1990)). A court’s decision to
relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient
information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under
I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729, 316 P.3d 640, 645 (2013); Hansen, 154
Idaho at 889, 303 P.3d at 248 (citing State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 290, 292
(2001)).
Vaughan is not an appropriate candidate for community supervision. He has a history of
poor performance on probation and violating the conditions of his probation by continuing to
abuse substances, failing to submit to drug testing, failing to complete substance abuse treatment,
and absconding supervision. (PSI, pp.60-61. 1) He was on probation for a DUI conviction and
had absconded supervision when he committed the instant offenses, wherein he sold marijuana
and “MDPV (Bath Salts)” – which he represented as “Molly (MDMA powdered Ecstasy pills)” –
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Vaughan 45353
psi.pdf.”
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to a confidential informant. (PSI, pp.59-60 (parenthetical notations original).) At the time, he
claimed that “the only illicit drug he had used was marijuana,” that he sold illegal substances in
the instant offense entirely for profit, and that the only substance he “had a problem with” was
alcohol. (PSI, pp.59, 66.) Vaughan’s probation officer opined that Vaughan was “‘not a good
candidate for probation and at this point … he is a risk to the community.’” (PSI, p.61.)
The district court placed Vaughan in the retained jurisdiction program, during which
Vaughan participated in programs including Moral Reconation Therapy, TAP 19 Relapse
Prevention, Life Skills Management, Family Reunification, Workforce Readiness, Success for
Life 10-Minute Cognitive Skills, Ben Franklin’s Moral Development Plan, Each One Teach One,
Aztec Learning System, Support Groups, and Community Group. (PSI, p.43.) Following the
period of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Vaughan on supervised probation. (R.,
pp.57-58.)

Despite having received extensive programming, Vaughan reported that “his

substance use and related activities continued” after he completed his rider. (PSI, p.91.) He
stated that he consumed alcohol less than two weeks after he was released on probation, with
“occasional alcohol use to intoxication” thereafter. (PSI, pp.11, 90.) While on probation,
Vaughan began abusing prescription pain medications – he admitted that he was “using
OxyContin on a regular basis” and also that he was “addicted to tramadol.” (R., p.70; PSI, p.93.)
He reported that he resumed his use of marijuana and, by May 2016, he was “smoking around 1
gram per day.” (PSI, pp.11, 90.) He also admitted to “intravenous use of methamphetamines
about 3 points daily” and “intravenous us[e] of heroin about 1 gram per day” while on probation.
(PSI, pp.18, 90.)
Vaughan’s probation officer placed him in a relapse prevention group in May 2016, but
Vaughan “continued to use while in this class and was then moved to [intensive outpatient]
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treatment at Recovery for Life.” (R., p.70.) In July 2016, Vaughan “went to a doctor … and was
prescribed Suboxone in the hopes that it would help him quit using opiates”; however, Vaughan
“did not engage in this treatment and continued to use.” (R., p.70; PSI, p.90.) On August 31,
2016, he tested positive for methamphetamine, heroin and marijuana, and he subsequently failed
to appear for his UA testing three weeks in a row and then stopped attending treatment
altogether. (R., p.70.) In October 2016, Vaughan was “given the chance to attend an inpatient
treatment program at the Walker Center,” at which time he admitted that he had been
“intravenously using large amounts of buprenorpherine” daily, in addition to his continued daily
use of marijuana and daily intravenous use of methamphetamine. (R., p.70; PSI, p.90.) Once
again, Vaughan failed to take advantage of the opportunity – he “was there a couple days and
was kicked out for failing to program and reports that he had offered drugs to other patients.”
(R., pp.70-71.) Thereafter, Vaughan failed to contact his probation officer and his whereabouts
were unknown. (R., p.70.)
Vaughan’s probation officer finally filed a report of violation, advising that Vaughan
“has had numerous chances for all the treatment that Idaho has to offer and has not engaged in
any of them. His behavior shows that he has no desire to stop using illegal substances,” and,
“The defendant does not appear to appreciate the privilege of probation, nor does it appear that
the defendant is amenable to supervision at the community level at this time.” (R., pp.70-71.)
After Vaughan admitted that he had violated his probation, the district court retained jurisdiction
a second time and Vaughan was placed in the CAPP rider program, during which he participated
in CBI-Substance Abuse and Pre-release classes. (PSI, p.96.) Although Vaughan received a
recommendation for probation, he subsequently incurred a DOR and program staff provided an
updated report, stating, “This new violation occurred two weeks before graduation which raises
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questions about his internalization. He has done the work necessary to complete the program;
however, based on his recent behavior, CAPP staff feels that he would benefit from a higher
level of supervision if allowed to return to the community.” (PSI, p.105.)
At the jurisdictional review hearing, the state recommended that the district court
relinquish jurisdiction, arguing:
… I think that this DOR that he got is the seriousness of it really can’t be
overstated, especially, given his history. We have a person who’s had many,
many opportunities to rehabilitate. There have been many opportunities given to
him both in and out of the community, in prison settings, secure settings, and also
on probation. The reported violation that was written by his probation officer last
time, really spoke quite a bit about how he’d been given several chances at drug
treatment, opportunities to engage in rehabilitative programming, and really had
squandered those, that he hadn’t taken advantage of them.
…
I think that [CAPP staff’s] concern about whether he has internalized
anything from the program, whether he’s really serious about changing his
criminal thinking, that question and concern is answered by his behavior, and if
you look at the history, it’s consistent with his past. I just continue to believe that
Mr. Vaughan has just gone through the motions and has for a long time.
(Tr., p.3, L.5 – p.4, L.10.) The district court subsequently stated, “[T]his was an abysmal
probation where … the recommendation from your first rider is you should do okay if you
engage in treatment, and you just simply didn’t.” (Tr., p.7, L.22 – p.8, L.3.) The court noted
that, “after his first rider, he did not engage in treatment in the community, was kicked out of
funded inpatient treatment, and continued to use methamphetamine, marijuana, and opiates while
on probation,” and, “In reviewing the rider report, the Defendant arrived at the CAPP facility
with an attitude of resistance, indicating he had previously done a rider and felt like he knew it
all. … While his performance over the rider improved, the very serious DOR warranting 45
days of restriction was simply a return to his prior resistant and manipulative behavior
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demonstrated before the first rider and during the interim on probation.” (R., pp.129-30 (citation
omitted).) The court stated:
And I do view this as a very serious rules violation, and quite frankly, it was
disturbing to me that it comes after you get a recommendation for probation,
indicating to me that you think that once no one is looking, you’re going to
engage in whatever behavior you want. Coupled with the fact that these were
very serious crimes, and the underlying crimes in this particular case, I am not
going to give you another opportunity of probation under the jurisdiction of this
court.
(Tr., p.8, Ls.3-12.)
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably determined
that Vaughan was no longer an appropriate candidate for probation, particularly in light of the
serious nature of the offense, Vaughan’s refusal to abide by the terms of community supervision,
his escalating substance abuse and failure to successfully complete treatment in the community,
and his failure to internalize the programming provided during his second rider. Given any
reasonable view of the facts, Vaughan has failed to establish that the district court abused its
discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction.
Vaughan next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion for reduction of sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.) If a sentence is within applicable
statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this
court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho,
201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Vaughan must “show that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the
district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id. Vaughan has failed to satisfy his burden.
Vaughan did not provide any new information in support of his Rule 35 motion. He
merely submitted a letter in which he reiterated that, while on his rider, he learned tools to help
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him be successful in the community, and that he would like to “use the tools he learned to
improve himself and to be a positive force in the lives of his children.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.45; R., pp.120-24.)

This was not “new” information, as Vaughan previously stated, at the

jurisdictional review hearing, that he learned “a lot” while on his rider and that he wanted an
opportunity to “do right by” his family and society. (Tr., p.7, Ls.10-19.) This information was
also contained in the July 24, 2017 APSI, wherein Vaughan stated, “‘I feel I should be granted
probation because I have the tools and resources necessary and available to be successful also I
can be a role model to my children and [t]o those younger than me on how to succeed
positively.’” (PSI, p.99.) Because Vaughan presented no new evidence in support of his Rule 35
motion, he failed to demonstrate in the motion that his sentences were excessive. Having failed
to make such a showing, he has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s
order denying his Rule 35 motion.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s orders relinquishing
jurisdiction and denying Vaughan's Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence.

DATED this 11th day of April, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11th day of April, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

9

